



Unlinkability of an Improved Key Agreement protocol for EMV 2nd Gen Payments

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


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WHAT IS EMV?




THERE IS NO PRIVACY IN EMV



Unwanted data collection in contactless payments is straightforward.

10.08.2022


EMVCO PROPOSAL: KEY ESTABLISHMENT



2012: "Blinded Diffie-Hellman RFC", EMVCo LLC

- provide authentication of the card by the terminal
- protect against eavesdropping and card tracking.


BLINDED DIFFIE-HELLMAN (BDH)



g the generator of the DH group, s PaySys signing key, $\text{pk}(s)$ PaySys verification key

c card's secret key, $c \cdot g$ card's public key, $\text{sig}(c \cdot g, s)$ signature on the card's public key


EAVESDROPPER → ACTIVE ATTACKER



1. An active attacker powers up the card
2. Establishes a symmetric key with the card
3. Obtains the long-term identities $c \cdot g, \text{sig}(c \cdot g, s)$

PASSIVE ATTACKER

Without BDH: no privacy



With BDH: privacy



(CLOSE) ACTIVE ATTACKER

Without BDH: no privacy




With BDH: no privacy



NO DIFFERENCE!

UNLINKABLE BLINDED DIFFIE-HELLMAN (UBDH)


Verheul condition: $a \cdot \text{sig}(M, s) =_E \text{sig}(a \cdot M, s)$



g the generator of the DH group, s PaySys signing key, $\text{pk}(s)$ PaySys verification key

c card's secret key, $c \cdot g$ card's public key, $\text{sig}(c \cdot g, s)$ signature on the card's public key

UNLINKABILITY




QUASI-OPEN BISIMILARITY

$$\textit{Small_Impl} \triangleq \nu s. \overline{\textit{out}}\langle \textit{pk}(s) \rangle. !\nu c. !\nu ch_c. \overline{\textit{card}}\langle ch_c \rangle. C(s, ch_c, c)$$

$$\textit{Small_Spec} \triangleq \nu s. \overline{\textit{out}}\langle \textit{pk}(s) \rangle. !\nu c. \nu ch_c. \overline{\textit{card}}\langle ch_c \rangle. C(s, ch_c, c)$$

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UNLINKABILITY




QUASI-OPEN BISIMILARITY

$$\begin{aligned}
 Impl \triangleq & \nu s. \\
 & \left(\begin{aligned}
 & !\nu c. \\
 & \overline{out}\langle pk(s) \rangle. \\
 & \overline{! \nu ch_c. card}\langle ch_c \rangle. C(s, ch_c, c) \mid \\
 & !\nu ch_t. \overline{term}\langle ch_t \rangle. T(s, ch_t) \end{aligned} \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 Spec \triangleq & \nu s. \\
 & \left(\begin{aligned}
 & !\nu c. \\
 & \overline{out}\langle pk(s) \rangle. \\
 & \overline{\nu ch_c. card}\langle ch_c \rangle. C(s, ch_c, c) \mid \\
 & !\nu ch_t. \overline{term}\langle ch_t \rangle. T(s, ch_t) \end{aligned} \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

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RESULTS: CONGRUENCE ENABLES COMPOSITIONAL REASONING



Theorem 1: If $Small_Impl \sim Small_Spec$, then $Impl \sim Spec$.

Proof.

- \sim is a congruence, hence is preserved by any context

- the context: $\nu out. \left(\{\cdot\} \mid \overline{out}(pk_s). \overline{out}' \langle pk_s \rangle ! \nu ch_t. \langle ch_t \rangle. T(pk_s, ch_t) \right)$



RESULTS: BDH PROTOCOL IS NOT UNLINKABLE



Theorem 2: $Small_Impl \not\equiv Small_Spec$ for BDH.

Proof.

$$Small_Impl \models \begin{array}{l} \langle \overline{out}(pk_s) \rangle \\ \langle \overline{card}(u_1) \rangle \langle \overline{u_1}(v_1) \rangle \langle u_1 y_1 \cdot g \rangle \langle \overline{u_1}(w_1) \rangle \\ \langle \overline{card}(u_2) \rangle \langle \overline{u_2}(v_2) \rangle \langle u_2 y_2 \cdot g \rangle \langle \overline{u_2}(w_2) \rangle \\ (\text{snd}(\text{dec}(h(y_1 \cdot v_1), w_1)) = \text{snd}(\text{dec}(h(y_2 \cdot v_2), w_2))) \end{array} \not\equiv Small_Spec$$



RESULTS: UBDH PROTOCOL IS UNLINKABLE



Theorem 3: $Small_Impl \sim Small_Spec$ for UBDH.

Proof.

- Define a relation (hard)
- Verify it is quasi-open bisimulation (not hard)

$$\begin{aligned}
 & UPD_{spec} \mathfrak{R} UPD_{impl} \\
 & UPD_{spec}^{\Psi}(\vec{Y}) \triangleq \nu s, c_1, \dots, c_L, ch_1, \dots, ch_L, \\
 & a_{l_1}, \dots, a_{l_K} \cdot (\sigma \\
 & \quad | C_1 | \dots | C_L \\
 & \quad | !\nu c. \nu ch. \overline{card}\langle ch \rangle. C_{upd}(s, c, ch)) \\
 & \mathfrak{R} \\
 & UPD_{impl}^{\Psi, \Omega}(\vec{Y}) \triangleq \nu s, c_1, \dots, c_D, ch_1, \dots, ch_L, \\
 & a_{l_1}, \dots, a_{l_K} \cdot (\theta \\
 & \quad | \dots | C_l^d | \dots | !\nu ch. \overline{card}\langle ch \rangle. C_{upd}(s, c_d, ch) \\
 & \quad | !\nu c. !\nu ch. \overline{card}\langle ch \rangle. C_{upd}((s, ch, c)))
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 C_l &= \begin{cases} \mathcal{E}^l(ch_l) & \text{if } l \in \alpha \\ \mathcal{F}^l(ch_l, a_l) & \text{if } l \in \beta \\ \mathcal{G}^l(ch_l, a_l, Y_l \sigma) & \text{if } l \in \gamma \\ \mathcal{H}^l & \text{if } l \in \delta \end{cases} \\
 C_l^d &= \begin{cases} \mathcal{E}^d(ch_l) & \text{if } l \in \zeta^d \cap \alpha \\ \mathcal{F}^d(ch_l, a_l) & \text{if } l \in \zeta^d \cap \beta \\ \mathcal{G}^d(ch_l, a_l, Y_l \theta) & \text{if } l \in \zeta^d \cap \gamma \\ \mathcal{H}^d & \text{if } l \in \zeta^d \cap \delta \end{cases} \\
 pk_s \sigma &= pk(s) \\
 u_l \sigma &= ch_l \quad \text{if } l \in \{1, \dots, L\} \\
 v_l \sigma &= \phi(a_l, \phi(c_l, \mathbf{g})) \quad \text{if } l \in \beta \cup \gamma \cup \delta \\
 w_l \sigma &= m^l(a_l, Y_l \sigma) \quad \text{if } l \in \delta \\
 \\
 pk_s \theta &= pk(s) \\
 u_l \theta &= ch_l \quad \text{if } l \in \{1, \dots, L\} \\
 v_l \theta &= \phi(a_l, \phi(c_d, \mathbf{g})) \quad \text{if } l \in \zeta^d \cap (\beta \cup \gamma \cup \delta) \\
 w_l \theta &= m^d(a_l, Y_l \theta) \quad \text{if } l \in \zeta^d \cap \delta \\
 \\
 \Psi &:= \{\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta\}, \quad \Omega := \{\zeta^1, \dots, \zeta^D\} \text{ are partitions of } \{1, \dots, L\} \\
 K &:= |\beta \cup \gamma \cup \delta| \quad l_1, \dots, l_K \in \beta \cup \gamma \cup \delta \\
 pk_s, u_l, v_l, w_l &\# \{card, s\} \cup \{c_l, ch_l, a_l \mid l \in \{1, \dots, L\}\} \\
 Y_l &\# \{s\} \cup \{c_l, ch_l, a_l \mid l \in \{1, \dots, L\}\} \\
 fv(Y_l) \cap (\{v_i \mid i \in \alpha\} \cup \{w_i \mid i \in \alpha \cup \beta \cup \gamma \cup \delta\}) &= \emptyset
 \end{aligned}$$

CONCLUSIONS

D. **Unlinkable** authenticated EMV **key establishment** in the presence of active attackers **is feasible**.

Quasi-open bisimilarity allows

A. To express **attacks** on privacy properties using **intuitionistic modal logic formulas**.

B. To prove that a privacy property holds by providing a **proof certificate** that is easy to check.

C. To reason about protocols **compositionally** by considering a **subsystem**, hence reducing the amount of work.



Thank you!

PICS SRC

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